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Abstract 
The paper examines the international law principle of the permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources from a critical perspective of its conflict with demands for global envi-
ronmental protection and sustainability. It is argued that state framed resource sovereignty 
per se does not represent an obstacle in the path of greater global environmental justice. 
The principle is strongly justified as a distinct economic expression of post-war state sov-
ereignty and the ramification of the universalization of such principles as decolonization, 
self-determination, territorial rights, and sovereign equality of states. It is instead the inter-
pretation of sovereignty and the set of practices established in the name of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources that undermine international environmental law – the 
extension of sovereign resource rights beyond state borders, the continuous priority of 
unrestricted resource rights and development rights over international standards for 
environmental protection and sustainable use of resources, and the failure to reinforce 
notions and principles, both conceptually and legally, that better correspond to the 
global nature and comprehensive demands of ecological systems. The paper argues that 
the plausibility of resource sovereignty depends on the interpretation of the concept of 
sovereignty and how it incorporates self-limiting standards in its exercise. A parallel is 
established between limiting resource sovereignty using environmental sustainability stand-
ards and ecological stewardship and human rights as a widely accepted constraint on the 
exercise of state power over the population. 
Keywords: sovereignty; resources; international environmental law; human rights.
Resumen. La limitación de la soberanía permanente sobre los recursos naturales
El ensayo examina el principio jurídico internacional de soberanía permanente sobre los 
recursos naturales desde una perspectiva crítica y analiza su posible colisión con la demanda 
de sostenibilidad y de una protección del medio ambiente a escala global. Se viene defen-
diendo que una soberanía nacional sobre los recursos naturales no es obstáculo alguno para 
la consecución de una justicia ambiental global de mayor alcance. La norma es fuertemente 
justificada como una expresión económica distinta de la soberanía estatal de postguerra y 
como una ramificación de la universalización de principios como descolonización, auto-
determinación, derechos territoriales y equidad de los estados en cuanto a su soberanía. 
Pero la interpretación de la soberanía y el aparato de prácticas establecidas en el nombre 
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de la soberanía permanente sobre los recursos naturales menoscaba, más bien, la ley 
ambiental internacional, por ejemplo mediante la extensión de los derechos soberanos 
sobre los recursos más allá de las fronteras de los estados, o estableciendo una prioridad 
continuada del derecho a un recurso abierto y del derecho al desarrollo por encima de las 
normas internacionales de protección ambiental y del uso de recursos sostenibles, o con-
tribuyendo al poco éxito en el refuerzo de nociones y principios, tanto conceptual como 
legalmente, que se correspondan mejor con la naturaleza global y las demandas compre-
hensivas de los sistemas ecológicos. El ensayo defiende que la plausibilidad de la soberanía 
sobre los recursos depende de la interpretación del concepto de soberanía y de la manera 
cómo incorpore normas autolimitadoras en el ejercicio de la misma. Se establece un 
paralelo entre limitar la soberanía sobre los recursos naturales mediante normas de soste-
nibilidad ambiental, y la vigilancia ecológica responsable y los derechos humanos como 
medidas limitadoras ampliamente aceptadas para regular el ejercicio del poder estatal 
sobre los ciudadanos.
Palabras clave: soberanía; recursos; ley internacional medioambiental; derechos humanos.
1. Introduction
Permanent sovereignty over natural resources is a firmly established standard 
of international law that authorizes states to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over 
natural resources and all components of the natural environment within their 
national boundaries. Ever since its introduction into international law in the 
late 1950s, this standard has been widely accepted by states and indigenous 
groups as an economic corollary of the fundamental right to self-determina-
tion. However, permanent sovereignty over natural resources has been con-
tested, if not downright refuted, by environmentalists and seekers of global 
justice, who argue that national borders and state sovereignty obstruct the 
solutions for such pressing global issues as climate change, environmental 
degradation, resource depletion, world poverty and economic inequality. 
In terms of ecological sustainability and environmental protection, state-
based resource sovereignty appears to be especially questionable. Increas-
ingly urbanized and globalized societies require an ever-growing number of 
resources: soil, water, sink for greenhouse gases and other waste etc. How-
ever, the capacity of the Earth’s biophysical and ecological systems to support 
modern life worldwide is reaching its limit. The critical environmental 
threshold may have been passed already. A group of scientists led by Johann 
Rockström recently identified nine measurable planetary boundaries and 
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showed that human beings had already surpassed three such boundaries: in 
greenhouse gas loading of the atmosphere, in nitrogen pollution, and in the 
loss of biological diversity (Rockström, 2012).1 It is beyond obvious that 
globalization, modernization, and development not observing responsible 
use and environmental protection will further undermine the capacity of 
life-supporting ecological systems to sustain themselves and hence provide 
ecosystem services for humans. 
Claims to permanent, full, inalienable, or absolute rights of states to 
natural resources within their boundaries, as justified by the permanent sov-
ereignty over natural resources, clearly undermine the global effort to safe-
guard the environment, if only because environmental systems operate with-
out paying heed to the firmly entrenched and yet historically contingent 
territorial jurisdictions of sovereign states. How should resource sovereignty, 
underlain by principles of autonomy and self-determination, the bedrocks 
of the modern international system, be reconciled with these concerns? In 
light of today’s pressing need for environmental protection, can resource 
sovereignty be justified at all? This paper argues that there are good reasons 
not to refuse state sovereignty as a framework for global environmental jus-
tice, or for other dimensions of global justice, for that matter. However, the 
viability of resource sovereignty, both in theory and in practice, depends on 
the very interpretation of the concept of sovereignty and the way it incorpo-
rates self-limiting standards in its exercise. A parallel already exists. Resource 
sovereignty can be limited by environmental sustainability and ecological 
stewardship standards in the same way that human rights constrain the exer-
cise of state power over its citizens. 
2.  The development of resource sovereignty:  
territorial expansion and economization
Permanent sovereignty over natural resources emerged from post-war efforts 
to reinforce the sovereign equality of states and economic equity in the post-
colonial international order. The original statement regarding this collective 
right is recorded in the United Nations Resolution Declaration on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources adopted in 1962. This resolution declares 
that permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources is an inherent 
1. The Earth’s biophysical and ecological systems include climate change, rate of biodiversity 
loss, nitrogen cycle, phosphorus cycle, stratospheric ozone depletion, ocean acidification, 
intensive global freshwater use, changes in land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and 
chemical pollution. According to Rockström, quantitative planetary boundaries are defined 
for each system as a threshold beyond which the systems move into a state in which they can 
no longer provide support for the social and economic development of human societies. For 
example, the suggested climate change boundary of 350 parts per million of carbon dioxide 
in the atmosphere aims to prevent crossing of the threshold beyond which a significant 
climate change will most likely occur (Rocsktröm, 2012; Folke, 2013).
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and overriding right of a state to control the use of its natural resources in its 
territory, thus protecting them against foreign infringement.2
Permanent sovereignty over natural resources was further confirmed and 
developed in a series of charters and resolutions dealing with human rights, 
international economic order, social progress, development, and the environ-
ment. The Human Rights Covenants from 1966, the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States (1974) and the Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order (1974) are the most important international law 
instruments through which resource sovereignty was affirmed erga omnes.3 As 
a result of these treaties and legal instruments, permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources legally protects the right of the states to unlimited control, 
free exploitation and disposal of natural resources in their territories, to choose 
their economic system without outside interference, and also to regulate and 
nationalize foreign investment.
While the standard of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is 
relatively unambiguous in its aim and origin in the decolonization process, it 
has been less clear what state prerogatives it authorizes and, more importantly, 
what practices cannot be justified in its name. When assessing the development 
of the set of practices established in the name of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources, one general tendency becomes apparent which, as Nico 
Schrijver rightly argued, is towards extending the scope of rights and preroga-
tives justified by resource sovereignty, with significantly less attention being 
paid to the question of what duties are incumbent on states and what kinds of 
limits are imposed on them in the exercise of their sovereignty over natural 
resources (Schrijver, 1997: 306). Unfortunately, it is in the field of environ-
mental sustainability and protection where the emphasis on limits and duties 
has not quite corresponded to the urgency of environmental issues.
From the perspective of the sustainability of global ecological systems, three 
problematic tendencies can be observed as critical in the process of the gradual 
establishment of the practice of resource sovereignty. First, economically moti-
vated pressure has been exerted by states to extend sovereign resource rights 
beyond their borders. Starting in the 1960s, this pressure led to a significant 
expansion of sovereign territoriality into marine areas and to a lesser extent into 
airspace and hence to the broadening of the scope of the appropriation of 
resources that had previously been international. Today, permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources comprises claims to natural resources and wealth not only 
on the land within a territory, but also to terrestrial and marine natural resources 
– and all economic activities for their exploitation (Schrijver, 2010: 111). 
The second parallel tendency is the continuous prevalence and priority of 
unrestricted resource rights and development rights over international standards 
2. The resolution is available here: <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/
RES/1803%28XVII%29>
3. In international law, erga omnes standards are the concern of all states regardless of their 
multilateral or bilateral agreements. All states have a legal interest in the protection of these 
standards; they are obligations for everyone. 
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for environmental protection and the sustainable use of resources. Although the 
sustainable use of natural resources underlies concepts such as the right to devel-
opment, human rights, and economic growth, there is clear anthropocentric 
and economic substance in the concept of sustainable development resulting 
from ongoing efforts to reinforce economic development in developing coun-
tries and reduce poverty and inequality. A retrospective look at UN confer-
ences and declarations on the environment show that the international com-
munity is actually less and less specific when it comes to guidelines for the 
management and conservation of natural resources, while it increasingly empha-
sizes the view that environmental policy should not obstruct development 
policy.4 At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 
2002, the principles of international environmental law and their role in the 
promotion of sustainable development were barely touched upon. Instead, strat-
egies for poverty reduction, food production, consumption and production 
patterns and the need to safeguard natural resources for the sake of social and 
economic development were addressed (Schrijver, 2008: 82, 96).
Finally, there has been a failure to reinforce, either conceptually or legal-
ly, notions and principles that better correspond to global nature and the 
comprehensive demands of ecological systems. International law, for exam-
ple, has not adopted any consistent framework for natural resource domains 
that are not subject to national jurisdiction but belong to the global commu-
nity as a whole. These resources are sometimes referred to as ‘global commons’. 
The climate, the atmosphere, outer space, and the high seas are obvious can-
didates for global commons located outside national borders. However, inter-
national law does not recognize the concept of global commons; and neither 
has it developed a consistent jurisdiction for these spaces. The so-called ‘com-
mon heritage of humankind’ regime, introduced to foster international coop-
eration for peaceful purposes and to share among all nations the benefits from 
the use of common resources from oceans, unfortunately remains conceptu-
ally underdeveloped and inconsistently applied. It has not provided a real 
environmental alternative to an essentially economic concept of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources (Schrijver, 2010: 75-113).
The development of the international law of the sea in recent decades 
might serve as a telling example of all these trends. Until the second half of the 
twentieth century, territorial sovereignty was strictly limited to land within 
state boundaries. Maritime states could only claim a narrow belt of the sea 
about three nautical miles off the coast. The use of the rest of the oceans was 
regulated by a regime called freedom of the high seas. This traditional principle 
of international law defined the sea as common to all and prohibited state-
based or private appropriation of its territory and resources. Ships could thus 
freely navigate the waters, and states could engage in trade and fishing. The 
4. Three conferences are relevant: the UN Conference on the Human Environment in 
Stockholm, 1971, the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 1992, and the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, 2002.
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assumption was that the sea’s resources are inexhaustible and that humans are 
unable to impair the quality of the marine environment. 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) from 
1982 substantially extended territorial sovereignty over maritime areas by 
dividing the sea into various legal zones measured from the coastal state’s base-
line. Territorial sea was extended to 12 nautical miles from the baseline, with 
the adjacent contiguous zone extended to 24 nautical miles. The Convention 
also introduced the so-called exclusive economic zone (EEZ) which extends as 
far as 200 nautical miles from the baseline, within which a coastal state does 
not enjoy complete territorial sovereignty (the state is obliged to respect free-
dom of navigation, for example). However, it does enjoy exclusive rights to the 
exploration, exploitation, management, and conservation of natural resources, 
both living (fisheries) and non-living (resources of the seabed and its subsoil). 
It is important to note that the pressure to claim much wider marine ter-
ritory was motivated by attempts to achieve equitable sharing of resources and 
reverse the legacy of the colonial economic order. This came from Latin Amer-
ican countries and newly independent African states who felt the need to halt 
the large-scale exploitation of what were supposedly ‘their’ fish stocks by for-
eign fishing fleets and oil by foreign oil companies. The classical freedom of 
the high seas implied open access to the sea and would have led to first-come-
first-served advantage for more economically powerful states. The continuation 
of this traditional standard would certainly have led to an unaccountable sys-
tem of predatory economic power, unlimited exploitation of resources, and 
some forms of colonial competition among rich maritime nations. A new legal 
regime was thus necessary to define standards for the proper and sustainable 
management of marine resources, to protect the economic security of coastal 
states, and simultaneously to ensure that the sea is preserved for the benefit of 
all (Schrijver, 1997: 205, 228).
Therefore, parallel to the affirmation and reinforcement of sovereign 
resource rights to the sea, a new principle of resource management for non-
sovereign maritime areas was introduced: the principle of the common heritage 
of mankind.5 Designed specifically for the use of maritime resources,6 this 
regime set standards and principles for the governance of non-sovereign areas 
and resources. The aim was to protect and manage common areas in the name 
of equity, preservation, and sharing by a global community. While resource 
5. The size of the maritime area to which the common heritage principle applies has been 
significantly reduced by the establishment of 200-mile EEZ and can be potentially further 
diminished by the possibility of the extension of the outer limits of EEZ up to 350 
nautical miles. EEZs, claimed or claimable, now cover about 35% of the marine area and 
are estimated to include approximately 90% of the living resources under commercial 
exploitation, tuna and whales being the main exception (Schrijver, 1997: 228). 
6. The principle was first formulated in the General Assembly Resolution from 1970 called 
the Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil 
Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction; then it was incorporated into 
UNCLOS.
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sovereignty protects exclusive national access to resources, common heritage 
of mankind is a form of resource management that prohibits sovereign or 
private appropriation. As opposed to exclusive appropriation, common inter-
national management, economic cooperation, the sharing of benefits from 
exploitation, the use of resources for peaceful purposes, freedom to engage in 
scientific research, and preservation for future generations are emphasized 
(Schrijver, 2010: 9).
However, the principle of the common heritage of humankind has not 
become a counterbalance to permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 
and especially to territorial expansion and the economization of resource man-
agement justified in its name. The principle of common heritage of human-
kind has only been applied to specific resources in the oceans, namely to the 
area of the deep seabed and the ocean floor and its subsoil. It remains unclear 
what the principle entails when it comes to these resources. With the recent 
discovery that the great ocean depths contain so-called ‘polymetallic nodules’ 
that are rich in valuable metals, and with ensuing attempts to examine and 
commercially exploit these resources, it is obvious that the seabed will not 
remain a completely decommercialized or scientific zone nor a resource pre-
served for future generations.7 
The environmental and non-economic aspirations of the principle of the 
common heritage of humankind are being further undermined by the possibil-
ity of extending the exclusive economic zone even further than 200 nautical 
miles. The Arctic region is currently a battleground where states motivated by 
resource grab are competing for further territorial extension of their exclusive 
economic zones. Although scientific data on what lies under the Arctic Ocean 
is incomplete, mineral deposits in the Arctic seabed are estimated to hold 25% 
of the world’s current oil and natural gas reserves (Sonntag, Luth, 2011). Tech-
nological developments and the recent ice melt, which is said to have reduced 
sea ice by as much as 50%, ignited territorial temptations and resource scram-
ble among Arctic states that are now striving to extend their exclusive economic 
zones beyond the 100 nm limit. In this area, which unlike Antarctica lacks a 
specific international legal regime to protect it against commercial 
exploitation,8 further territorial expansion is in fact possible on the basis of the 
criteria for the delimitation of maritime zones set in UNCLOS. 
7. As a matter of international law, all rights to these polymetallic nodules are vested in 
humankind as a whole. In practice, this means that the International Seabed Authority 
(ISA) issues contracts that authorize exploration and mining and collects and distributes 
royalties, taking into consideration the needs and interests of developing countries. So far, 
research is only being conducted by the governments of China, India, South Korea, France, 
Germany, and Russia (Schrijver, 2010: 76-78).
8. Antarctica is designated as an area that shall be used only for peaceful purposes, including 
scientific investigation. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 declared Antarctica a special 
conservation area and froze states’ existing claims to sovereignty. Furthermore, there is a 50 
year moratorium on Antarctic mineral resource activities established through the adoption 
of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty in Madrid in 1991.
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These criteria allow states to further expand their exclusive economic zone 
to 350 nautical miles from the baseline or to 110 nautical miles from the 2,500 
meter isobath,9 whichever is more favorable to the applicant State. The coastal 
state has to prove that there is a continental shelf attributable to it that reaches 
that far as a natural prolongation of its land territory.10 Countries such as 
Russia and Canada have devoted significant resources to measuring and map-
ping their extended continental shelves in order to establish resource sover-
eignty over the Arctic Ocean floor and its subsoil beyond their 200-mile 
exclusive economic zones. In August 2007, a Russian expedition placed a 
Russian flag on the seabed at the North Pole, claiming it as the utmost peak 
of its territory prolonged by submarine geological formations in its conti-
nental shelf.
As for the living resources of the high seas (fish stocks), these are not man-
aged using the principle of the common heritage of mankind but through the 
principle of open access. In practice, this means that all states have the right to 
engage in fishing on the high seas on a first come, first served basis. As a result 
of this regulation, almost all living resources (fisheries) in the world’s oceans 
were brought under commercial exploitation. Freedom of fishing is limited by 
UNCLOS provisions regarding the conservation and management of the living 
resources of the high seas. To avoid overexploitation, the state is obliged to 
maintain the population of harvested species at levels that can produce ‘the 
maximum sustainable yield’.11
Nevertheless, the vast majority of exploited fish populations have been 
depleted to abundance levels well below those recommended by conventional 
management guidelines. According to several reports, most fish species are on 
a continuing trajectory of decline (Pikitch, 2012). The World Bank report of 
2009 predicts that if current fishing rates continue, all the world’s fisheries will 
have collapsed by the 2050s (The World Bank, 2009). Faced with the collapse 
of large-fish populations, commercial fleets are searching deeper in the ocean 
and farther down the food chain for viable catches. This ‘fishing down’ is trig-
gering a chain reaction that is upsetting the delicate balance of the sea’s bio-
logic system. And yet, an ecosystem based approach with more precautionary 
management has not replaced traditional management of fisheries focused on 
obtaining the maximum sustainable yield for a single species of fish and ignor-
ing the detrimental effects of fishing on the entire ecosystem. 
 9. Isobath is defined in bathymetry as the line connecting points at a depth of 2,500 meters 
below sea level.
10. UNCLOS provides an exception to this rule. If the continental shelf breaks into an oceanic 
ridge, it cannot be extended to more than 350 nm from the coast no matter where the 2,500 
meter isobath falls. This issue lies at the heart of the Russian dispute over parts of the Arctic 
territory. Russia challenges the definition of the Lomonosov and Alpha-Mendeleev ridges as 
submarine ridges, claiming instead that they are natural geographical components of their 
continental shelf reaching to the North Pole (Sonntag, Luth, 2011). 
11. Marine mammals are subject to a different management regime with stronger protection 
and conservation measures (Schrijver, 2010: 83-88).
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As the example of marine resources shows, the principle of common heritage 
of humankind (a potentially far-reaching principle applicable as a set of protec-
tive measures of ecological systems regardless of the lack of an overlap with the 
state territory) does not represent an environmental alternative to the regime of 
territorial sovereignty, which explicitly protects the right to economic appro-
priation and exploitation of resources. Its application to other candidates for 
global commons has also been ambiguous.12 For example, the atmosphere does 
not enjoy any special legal status or governance regime. Despite atmospheric 
resources sharing many features with natural resources in international areas, 
they are not global commons. When they are located above areas under the 
national jurisdiction of states and above exclusive economic zones, they are 
subject to the sovereignty of states. The remaining atmospheric resources are a 
common property, providing a completely free and open waste disposal system 
for a whole range of pollutants (Schrijver, 2010: 98). Only recently, the ozone 
layer and the climate system were vaguely declared a ‘common concern of 
humankind’ and their protection has become the subject of several protocols 
stipulating the necessary measures and control mechanisms for tackling ozone 
depletion and climate change.13
3. Sovereignty, territory, and global justice
Is the standard of permanent sovereignty over natural resources per se the 
obstacle to achieving greater global justice, environmental or other? I argue 
that the problem is not resource sovereignty itself. The key to responding to 
global issues is a proper understanding of the concept of sovereignty and the 
interpretation of resource sovereignty as being constituted by limits and duties, 
exactly like state sovereignty today is understood as being constituted and 
limited by human rights standards. Simultaneously, the reinforcement of the 
global regime for the management and protection of resources or ecological 
systems (both within sovereign territories and beyond them) must complement 
the reinterpretation of resource sovereignty.
12. For example, the non-appropriation of resources is not clearly articulated in any treaty or 
agreement regulating outer space and celestial bodies. The Moon Agreement from 1979, 
ratified by only 13 states (none of which are capable of space exploitation), stipulates that 
states have the right to exploration and use of the moon without discrimination of any 
kind and on an equal basis. Unlike UNCLOS, the agreement does not establish a specific 
institutional structure to govern the exploitation of these resources (Schrijver, 2010: 88-90). 
13. The Montreal Protocol was adopted to reduce the emission of ozone-depleting substances. 
Unfortunately, the ratification of most recent amendments with stronger control measures 
has been seriously lagging despite the obvious fact that the gap in the Antarctic’s ozone layer 
will persist longer than estimated. As regards climate change, the Kyoto Protocol from 1997 
determines measures necessary for stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse 
gases. Support and participation in the Protocol has been low; and ensuing conferences 
on climate change have not produced any binding commitments on further reduction of 
emissions (Schrijver, 2010: 101-110).
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The reasons not to dismiss permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
are of both a historical and conceptual nature. Resource sovereignty is unintel-
ligible if one does not understand its political significance in the historical 
context. As the history of post-war international law shows, resource sover-
eignty originated in negotiations over the inequitable arrangements imposed 
on colonized nations during the colonial period. The exploitation and appro-
priation of resources by foreign companies and their insistence on the conti-
nuity of their contractual rights to exploit the resources in the new post-
colonial era were among the most salient injustices that the new standard of 
resource sovereignty corrected. Contrary to the terms of foreign investment 
contracts from the colonial period, developing nations claimed rights of own-
ership of their resources, understood as a corollary of a more fundamental 
right to self-determination and independence. The utilization of a state’s own 
natural resources protected by permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
was an essential prerequisite for economic development and the bulwark 
against predatory and imperial forms of economic power and economic dom-
ination, and hence the bedrock of political independence (Anghie, 2005; 
Sornarajah, 2010).
Permanent sovereignty over natural resources has therefore become a widely 
accepted principle of a new international order and an inherent element of 
post-war state sovereignty. From the conceptual perspective, the emergence 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources marks a profound transmuta-
tion of the institution of state sovereignty in the twentieth century that went 
largely unnoticed by political theory. Permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources translates the principles inherent in the concept of sovereignty (inde-
pendence, autonomy, non-intervention, and self-determination) into the 
economic sphere. It emphasizes territorially determined resource rights as 
an economic expression of state sovereignty. But how do we account for eco-
nomic competences and prerogatives of sovereign states? Is there any continuity 
between the concept of economic sovereignty and political sovereignty in the 
discourse about the state and sovereignty in political theory? Can the notion of 
economic sovereignty be derived from the predominantly legal discourse about 
political authority and state power over persons? What is the normative concep-
tion of economic rights and competences of the state and their limits? 
Unfortunately, modern discourse on sovereignty offers almost no clues for 
answering these questions and so it is no wonder that a theory of economic 
aspects of state sovereignty and territoriality is still missing from political theory. 
This is because political and legal discourse on sovereignty has, for the most 
part, identified the state with its constitutional form and focused on the jurid-
ical-political questions about the form, the location, and limits on political 
power. From this legalistic perspective, territory has appeared to have a merely 
functional meaning of spatial circumscription of a sphere of jurisdiction over 
a population located within geographic boundaries. The concept of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources can thus hardly appear as a corollary of the 
traditional discourse about sovereignty framed as a problem of legality and 
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legitimacy of political authority whose jurisdiction is thought to be directed 
primarily at persons. 
A much younger framework of territorial rights and rights to self-determina-
tion to which resource sovereignty is connected historically might offer a starting 
point for an account of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. A theory 
of territorial rights, which includes the account of collective rights of the people 
over natural resources, is indeed the appropriate conceptual framework for under-
standing collective sovereign claims over resources. The theory of territorial rights 
emerged only very recently in response to several pressing issues, such as the need 
to find a resolution for territorial disputes or to respond to the claims to territory 
made by indigenous peoples (Ivison, 2002; Hendrix, 2008), and of course to the 
need to resolve the question of the claims to resources and their redistribution, 
domestically and globally (Beitz, 1990; Steiner, 1996; Pogge, 2002). 
One of the distinct features of the theory of territorial rights is that it shifts 
attention from narrow juridical-political concern with the form, location, and 
limits on political power towards a more fundamental question of the moral 
justification of the existence of sovereign political authority and of rights, 
duties, and demands that belong to it. In this respect, theorists of territorial 
rights are reviving, explicitly or implicitly, the approach of early modern natu-
ral law thinkers who used to ask what justifies political authority and state 
sovereignty over particular populations and territories. Natural law thinkers 
assumed that both the sovereignty and territoriality of political authority play 
a vital role in implementing the conditions of justice. The territorial scope of 
sovereign political power had a broader meaning in this somewhat forgotten 
tradition of political thought insofar as the people’s territorial rights (individual 
property rights and collective resource rights, for example) were conceived as a 
matter of pre-political natural law and justice. Sovereign rights to set positive 
laws were designed with the purpose of reinforcing and safeguarding this natural 
justice, which included not only peace and security, but also private property and 
the economic system (Locke, [1689] 1980). Later, the preoccupation with con-
stitutionalism narrowed the discourse on sovereignty down to the question of 
the legality of sovereign political authority (Kelsen, [1934] 1970).
Some of the most recent approaches to the theory of territorial rights have 
been inspired by the link natural law theorists established between sovereignty, 
territoriality, and justice. Cara Nine, for example, offers a contemporary lib-
eral-collectivist defense of territorially limited resource rights. Nine defends 
the view that the holder of territorial rights is a collective with the capacity to 
be politically self-determining and can establish justice within a particular 
geographical space through legislation and the adjudication and enforcement 
of laws regarding persons and natural resources. Recalling natural law tradition, 
she emphasizes that the justification for the claim made by a collective to be a 
territorial right holder comes from the paramount value of justice for the 
members of this collective. 
Peace, security, and the protection of private property emphasized by early 
modern natural law thinkers are important parts of the implementation of the 
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idea of justice. However, in order to implement justice in contemporary society, 
these basic human needs must, in Nine’s view, be extended. Relying on new 
interdisciplinary research in social sciences combining psychology, ethics, moral 
philosophy, and social policy,14 Nine thus expands the notion of justice into a 
new paradigm of human well-being that depends not only on the rule of law 
but also material welfare and economic development. Consequently, territo-
rial rights involve more than a legitimate claim to make, adjudicate, and 
enforce legal rules over persons within a territorial domain. As Nine shows, they 
also include jurisdictional rights over resources within the territory: the authority 
to determine property rights, to determine the management, withdrawal and 
alienation of natural resources etc. (Nine, 2012: 6-9).
Nine’s theory helps to recast the territorial meaning of sovereignty in eco-
nomic terms. Simultaneously, it offers a response to global justice theorists and 
cosmopolitans who refuse territorial sovereignty and the institution of territo-
rially demarcated political authority as a means of implementing the conditions 
of justice (Beitz, 1990; Barry, 1991; Pogge, 2002; Caney, 2005). Critical 
examination of theories of global justice is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Suffice to say that regardless of the scope of justice (domestic or global), it 
necessarily presupposes the idea that a collective is entitled to goods or 
resources. Such an entitlement can be explained and justified only by a theory 
of territorial rights that addresses who is a legitimate holder of territorial rights, 
what these rights exactly involve, and what justifies such an exclusive territorial 
claim (Nine, 2012: 146).
While such a territorial claim can be global in scope, I believe that there are 
good reasons to maintain the framework of state sovereignty. For one reason, 
the state involves the correspondence between jurisdictional authority over a 
community of persons and rights over resources. These are two inseparable ways 
of establishing justice for members of a collective. While both these authorities 
can be theoretically be conceived as belonging to a global community, the sov-
ereign territorial state remains the institution that involves a public, coercive 
and legitimate legal order, with direct effect on individuals, and creating distinct 
associative obligations and duties. Moreover, only within the framework of the 
sovereign territorial state are both authorities bound to conditions that make 
them politically legitimate in a relatively strong sense. Therefore, the goals of 
global justice are better achieved through limits that territorial collectives impose 
on themselves. The question is thus what limits need to be inserted in the con-
ception of territorial rights that prevent collectivities (states) from assertively 
expanding their territorial rights, from engaging in controversial practices such 
as unlimited and environmentally harmful exploitation of natural resources or 
from economic exploitation or devastation of global commons.
14. For example, the “capabilities approach” popularized by Martha Nussbaum stresses that 
basic human needs are irreducible to mere physiological maintenance and extend to active 
social and political well-being that depends on what individuals are effectively able to be 
(Nussbaum, 2000). 
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To conclude: permanent sovereignty over natural resources is a standard 
implied in the conception of collective territorial rights that emphasizes the 
inextricable link between political self-determination, autonomy, sovereignty 
and, independence on the one hand, and the autonomy to determine the 
social and economic system on the other. When accounted for in this frame-
work, permanent sovereignty over natural resources is the economic corollary 
of state sovereignty, and of the principles of sovereign statehood universalized 
only after World War II: political self-determination, supremacy of domestic 
legal order, external independence, social and economic autonomy, sovereign 
equality and non-intervention. (Cohen, 2012: 200). The task is to avoid the 
interpretation of resource sovereignty in terms of permanent, absolute, inalien-
able, full sovereignty and to interpret it in terms of self-limiting standards that 
restrain its exercise. 
4. International human rights law and environmental law
In the final section of the paper, I would like to discuss the possibility of 
restraining resource sovereignty using environmental ethics and sustainable 
development standards. To assert the idea of constitutive self-limiting standards 
in the exercise of sovereignty, I suggest we explore and use human rights dis-
course as a model for the de-absolutization of sovereign resource rights. First, 
I shall briefly summarize the impact of human rights, both as a discourse and 
practice, on the institution of state sovereignty.
Sovereignty emerged in early modern political thought as a concept of a 
supreme political power that has the sole authority to create law. To highlight 
this novel, quintessentially modern concept of the supreme political authority 
and its unity with law enactment and enforcement, early modern political 
thinkers (Hobbes in particular) characterized sovereignty in terms of the unity, 
indivisibility, unconditionality, and unlimitedness of the absolute power 
unbound by the covenant that institutes it (Hobbes, [1651] 1985). Based on 
the first modern theories of sovereignty, the concept of sovereignty has been 
generally interpreted as involving the following tenets: 1) the idea that sover-
eignty is located in a single and unitary organ of the state or is embodied in a 
person; 2) the idea that the coherence and unity of a legal system have to be 
traceable back to the will of the sovereign, who is legibus solutus, i.e. above the 
law; 3) the view that law ought to be obeyed merely because it is the sovereign’s 
command; and 4) the view that sovereignty is linked to a specific set of pre-
rogatives that also include the jus belli (right to war) which renders sover-
eignty incompatible with international law. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to ask whether this is the right inter-
pretation of the original concept of sovereignty.15 The fact remains that until 
15. I argue elsewhere that this interpretation does not do justice to the essence of the concept 
of sovereignty and that constitutionalism is the original discourse about sovereignty 
(Gümplová, 2011).
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World War II, sovereignty was understood as a political fact of absolute and 
impermeable state power existing independent from and prior to interna-
tional law. In the second half of the 20th century, a momentous transformation 
had a serious impact on the concept of sovereignty and the practice of sover-
eign statehood. On one hand, there was an unprecedented effort to regulate 
the use of military force and install a global security regime. Contemporary 
sovereign states no longer have the right to go to war and to annex or colonize 
foreign territories. On the other hand, the prerogatives of sovereign states in 
the domestic sphere have changed under the impact of international laws on 
human rights.16
The international human rights regime has developed steadily since 1948 
through multilateral treaty making, domestic state practice, and the work of 
international courts and other actors. Dozens of human rights treaties are now 
in effect due to organizations such as the United Nations, the Council of 
Europe, the Organization of American States, and the African Union. Some 
of these treaties have been ratified by more than three-quarters of the world’s 
countries. The main source of the contemporary conception of human rights 
is still the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted in 1948, 
which indicates rights such as that to live, freedom from torture, freedom from 
slavery, right to a fair trial, freedom of speech, freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion, freedom of movement, and the right to engage in political activ-
ity as universal rights for all peoples irrespective of their nationality or politi-
cal allegiance. The reaffirmation of these rights in numerous international 
covenants and resolutions and the incorporation of these rights in national 
constitutions have made human rights articulated under terms of the UDHR 
almost universally accepted standards for human well-being and political alle-
giance (Beitz, 2011).
As human rights theorists of all proveniences agree, human rights protect 
the basic rights of all individuals by virtue of being human. They are universal, 
i.e. they are valid and binding on all individuals and societies whatever their 
religion, tradition, or culture. An important feature of human rights is that 
they are meant to protect the essential and universal features of human person-
hood against the state.17 As Jean Cohen emphasized, human rights are thus 
‘associational’ rights, activated by the presence of and membership of specific 
socio-political institutions. As such, they impose constraints on these institu-
16. There are countless accounts of how the post-World War II international legal order 
based on the sovereign equality of states and international law based on consent is being 
complemented by a new system of geo-governance by the international community and 
intergovernmental networks addressing issues of human rights and security (Teitel, 2011; 
Sikkink, 2011; Fox, 2008).
17. Dignity, freedom, and equality are usually cited as the most fundamental moral features 
of personhood. There are a number of approaches to human rights; and they differ not 
just in how they provide general justification of human rights, but also in explaining what 
essential and universal features of human beings must be protected by human rights – 
agency, personhood, basic interests, capabilities, autonomy, and dignity. For an overview, 
see Donnelly (2013: 7-21).
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tions and on those acting in their name. They function as standards for state 
governments such that their violation or non-fulfillment is justification for 
remedial action by the global community. International human rights thus 
indicate that the way a state treats its own citizens is a matter of international 
concern (Cohen, 2012: 182).
Many cosmopolitan thinkers and legal theorists argue that today, the state 
sovereignty and legitimacy of governments should be considered contingent 
on their being both non-aggressive externally and, more importantly, mini-
mally just internally, i.e. respectful of human rights (Macdonald, Johnston, 
2005; Klabbers et al., 2009). Although there are ‘statist’ thinkers who insist 
that international law still is and should remain protective of state sovereignty, 
domestic autonomy, and non-intervention, a profound transformation is 
indeed occurring. Under the impact of human rights and collective security 
standards, there has been a shift from the classic statist interpretation of sov-
ereignty as independence, non-intervention, and impunity to the interpreta-
tion of sovereignty as justice and security for individuals and citizens of a given 
state, and hence responsibility and accountability to the international com-
munity and potentially also the liability of perpetrators (state officials or pri-
vate entities) in terms of international sanctions (Cohen, 2012: 159-162).
It is beyond doubt that the concept of sovereignty has changed over time 
in light of this new global principle of legitimacy, namely respect for human 
rights. Human rights provide a regulatory source of limitations on the pre-
rogatives of sovereign states and a government’s power. However, sovereignty 
has not been displaced by human rights. As Jean Cohen rightly argued, inter-
national human rights treaties are not designed to abolish state sovereignty 
and replace it with a cosmopolitan legal order but to encourage states to 
construct and commit to a common international standard and to abide by it 
in their domestic law and policies (Cohen, 2012: 162). Sovereignty and 
human rights are two distinct but interrelated legal principles of the same, 
dualistic, international political system. This dualistic political system is com-
posed of sovereign states (and the international law they make through consent) 
and new global governance institutions that provide global cosmopolitan legal 
elements derived from non-derivative human rights standards. States are still 
autonomous and self-determining. However, when a state commits genocide 
or enslavement or oppresses its people in radical ways, it is subject to the 
international community’s concern or potential intervention justified by invio-
lable human rights (Cohen, 2012: 201-207).
It is also obvious that the international human rights regime differs sub-
stantially from other international regimes. Although there has yet to be a 
systematic comparative analysis of different international law regimes in com-
parative law studies, it can be argued, as Donnelly did, that unlike other 
regimes, the international human rights regime verges on authoritative inter-
national standard setting, creation and elaboration (Donnelly, 1986: 608). 
There is an advanced and rich philosophical discourse with a long tradition 
regarding the nature, essence, scope, and justification of human rights. 
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Although interpreted in various ways, there is an accepted view that human 
rights appeal to a universally valid conception of human well-being and interests. 
Human rights standards are coherent, strong, and widely accepted. Such con-
cepts as the prohibition of genocide, slavery, and torture are considered jus 
cogens: they represent fundamental, overriding principles of international law 
from which no derogation is permitted. There is a relatively complex and 
centralized system of global governance based on the legalization of human 
rights and globalization of human rights discourses that includes interna-
tional standard setting, treaty making and monitoring bodies creating erga 
omnes obligations, international criminal law and the international criminal 
court, and, as of late, the development of humanitarian law.
Does international environmental law enjoy comparable authority? Despite 
its proliferation in recent decades18 (there has been considerable activity concern-
ing treaty making, agreements, resolutions, decisions of various international 
courts and tribunals (there is no international environmental court, however) 
and soft law instruments such as declarations following environmental confer-
ences and the literature, especially following the Earth Summit in Rio de 
Janeiro in 199219) the international environmental protection regime is com-
parably less authoritative than the human rights regime. In fact, as many 
observers agree, international environmental law provides an ineffective legal 
response to environmental degradation (Leary, Pisupati, 2010). Not only is 
there little compliance with policy goals set in treaties and declarations made 
in the aftermath of the Rio Summit (especially concerning the reduction of 
CO2 emissions); the role of international environmental law is actually 
declining. As Schrijver points out, the World Summit on Sustainable Develop-
ment in Johannesburg in 2002 focused largely on development goals (reduc-
tion of poverty, sustainable food production, the management of natural 
resources as the basis of social and economic development) and made little 
reference to the role of international environmental law in promoting the 
sustainability of resources (Schrijver 2008, 71-76, 95-96). 
From the critical perspective of the Earth’s vital ecosystems reaching dan-
gerous planetary boundaries that I suggested at the beginning of the paper, 
the most salient failure of the international regime of environmental protec-
tion is that there is no legally and politically relevant conception of global 
environment or ecological system(s) overlying and complementing the deeply 
18. Environmental law is still a very young branch of international law. Current issues of 
international concern covered by environmental law include ozone layer depletion and 
global warming, desertification, destruction of tropical rain forests, pollution of air and water, 
international trade in endangered species (i.e. ivory), shipment of hazardous wastes to Third 
World countries, deforestation of Brazil and the Philippines, protection of wetlands, oil 
spills, transboundary nuclear air pollution (i.e. Chernobyl), dumping of hazardous wastes, 
groundwater depletion, international trade in pesticides, and acid rain.
19. The conference produced important multilateral treaties – Climate Change Convention 
and Biodiversity Convention. Treaties addressing anti-desertification, the conservation and 
management of fisheries, and climate change followed in the 1990s (Schrijver, 2008: 
68-76).
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embedded division of the Earth into sovereign territories. Not only has 
international environmental law failed to provide a systematic and elaborate 
descriptive and prescriptive conception of vital planetary ecosystems (here, 
the ozone layer, climate system, ocean ecosystem, and tropical rainforests20 
would be the most obvious examples); it has, as already indicated, not 
adopted any consistent framework or jurisdiction for domains that are out-
side of state boundaries (the atmosphere, polar regions, high seas). The com-
mon heritage of humankind regime, introduced to promote international 
cooperation and the sharing of economic benefits among all nations, unfor-
tunately remains a regime of resource use and exploitation with relatively 
vague implications. An alternative approach, for example that of ‘ecological 
stewardship’ (Chapin et al., 2009), which might better respond to the idea 
of responsible and sustainable use and conservation of the environment, has 
not yet made it into philosophical and legal debates, and it has not been 
addressed either in international environmental law or in the theory of ter-
ritorial or resource rights.
Regrettably, the only relatively well-developed standard that serves as the 
source for constraints on the state based principle of the permanent sover-
eignty over natural resources remains that of sustainable development. Having 
expanded impressively in a relatively short period of time, the concept of sus-
tainable development has indeed become firmly established in international 
and domestic law. Today, sustainable development (the protection and conser-
vation of the environment and resources for the benefit of present and future 
generations) represents one of the core values of the international community, 
similar to peace, security, and human rights (Schrijver, 2008: 29). But does it 
provide an effective and strong catalogue of limits and duties regarding resource 
sovereignty?
The introduction of the concept of sustainable development in the 1980s 
represented a considerable change of paradigm in the practice of resource sov-
ereignty, which until then had been limited by a few standards or principles, 
such as good neighborliness, the duty not to cause trans-boundary damage and 
of course limits resulting from the contractual rights of foreign investment 
companies. Sustainable development has acknowledged resource sovereignty 
and economic development as primary interests of states; however, it defined 
such development as being restricted by the capability of future generations 
to also fulfill their needs via development.21 Since the publication of the 
Brundtland Commission’s report Our Common Future, sustainable develop-
ment has become legally grounded in numerous global and regional treaties 
in countless areas. It has been solidly embedded in conventions and protocols 
20. The International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) is the only agreement to directly 
address rainforest deforestation. However, the ITTA exclusively focuses on the timber trade, 
so it cannot completely accomplish the goal of rainforest preservation. 
21. This is a definition introduced by the Brundtland Commission (United Nations, 1987): 
sustainable development is the development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
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addressing climate change, the conservation of biological diversity and marine 
biodiversity, fisheries and freshwater resources, marine and trans-boundary air 
pollution, desertification, and other areas. Across various areas, the standard 
posits a desirable future state for human societies in which the use of the 
environment and resources meet human needs without undermining their 
sustainability or capacity to serve the needs of future generations.
The concept of sustainable development has broadened over time. Today, 
unfortunately, it represents a rather vague notion for everything good for 
the environment. There is a tendency observed by many critics concerning the 
weakening of the standard of sustainable development vis-à-vis other general 
international laws (security and humanity) and also persistent reorientation 
towards social and economic development. As Schrijver argues, sustainable 
development has developed from the original meaning of sustainable use of 
natural resources, i.e. the use that preserves these resources for future use, to 
an anthropocentric notion with a dominant socio-economic substance. Today, 
it is intended to serve not simply the needs of environmental protection but 
also entails reorientation of the international community to the world’s eco-
nomic system and persistent efforts to tackle the problem of development in 
the Third World (Schrijver, 2008: 217; Birnie et al., 2002: 45).
This tendency is reinforced by the introduction of the ‘right to develop-
ment’, the youngest of human rights concepts, and its recognition as a univer-
sal and inalienable right and an integral part of the catalogue of fundamental 
human rights.22 The content, nature, and status of this right are still contested 
and there is no political consensus on its practical interpretation. However, the 
right to development represents the latest expression of the recurrent effort to 
reform unjust international economic order towards one based on social welfare 
and social justice. Hence, a vital link between sustainability and civil, political, 
economic, and social rights has been fostered, but not with environmental 
law.23 The right to development is aimed at the integration of economic and 
human rights issues in one coherent policy framework. Rather than evolving 
parallel to human rights as a standard limiting the economic sovereignty of 
states, sustainable development thus lost its environmental potential by turning 
(social and economic) development into a human right. Regrettably, rather 
than being reinforced and strengthened so as to compensate for the lack of an 
effective global regime of environmental protection, sustainable development 
22. The Declaration on the Right to Development was adopted by the UN in 1986. It defines 
the right to development as “an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human 
person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, 
social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms can be fully realized.” Since then, the UN has devoted substantial resources to 
elevating the significance of this right and to promoting its implementation. At the World 
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, it was recognized as a universal and 
inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental human rights. 
23. The text of the UNDRD makes no mention of the environment whatsoever (Bunn, 2000: 
1442).
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weakened under the impact of the growing significance of social and eco-
nomic human rights. 
Contemporary use of sustainable development in various regimes and dis-
courses emphasizes principles that express the clear statist and economic orien-
tation of the concept.24 These principles involve: the duty of states to ensure 
the sustainable use of natural resources, the principle of equity and the eradi-
cation of poverty, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
of countries, the precautionary principle and environmental impact assess-
ment, public participation, good governance, and the principle of integration 
and interrelation. These principles reflect the fact that states are committed to 
correcting the failures of the global economic system and to intra-generational 
justice (the eradication of poverty) rather than to inter-generational justice; 
and that industrial nations carry a heavier burden of environmental protection. 
The emphasis on good governance indicates that there is a shift from environ-
mental protection to general principles of government and resource management 
such as efficiency, non-corruptibility, transparency, financial accountability, 
responsibility to civil society, and the legitimacy of decision-making. 
Permanent sovereignty over natural resources remains the most significant 
legal and political framework in any effort to tackle environmental problems. 
Unfortunately, due to failures by the international environmental regime to 
promote the conception of non-sovereign territoriality and suitable jurisdic-
tion for it, and due to the growing emphasis on economic development and 
social justice in domestic state policies, the degree of restraint in resource 
sovereignty has not really increased over time. In the current interpretation, 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources thus undermines the urgent need 
for the global community to assume responsibility for the protection of envi-
ronment.
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